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ABSTRACT 
One of the most successful pieces of civil rights legislation in American History, the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 helped achieve a level of black enfranchisement that had seemed impossible since the 
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment nearly a century earlier.  Indispensable to the VRA’s 
success was Section 5, which turns the tables on jurisdictions deemed to be the worst offenders by 
creating a presumption of racial discrimination that had to be overcome by “preclearing” any 
change in voting practices with federal authorities.  Although the VRA has withstood a number of 
constitutional challenges over the years, the Supreme Court recently held that the formula 
determining which jurisdictions are subject to preclearance is outdated and unconstitutional.  Left 
unresolved, however, is what standard of review should apply in assessing the constitutionality of 
statutes enacted under Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power.   
This Article argues that if the Court eventually applies the well-established Fourteenth Amendment 
“congruence and proportionality” standard, this will be a rather remarkable doctrinal 
development. Instead, legislation enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment should be subject to a more 
deferential standard for several reasons.  First, there is no reason why the similarities in the two 
amendments’ enforcement clauses must necessarily lead to identical enforcement powers.  Second, 
the Supreme Court has not, in fact, applied the Fourteenth Amendment standard to Section 5.  
Third, because the subject matter of the Fifteenth Amendment is so much narrower than that of the 
Fourteenth, the Court need not worry about granting more deference to Congress in enforcing it.  
Finally, to prevent the Fifteenth Amendment from being swallowed by the Fourteenth, the Court 
should decline to conflate the applicable standards of review. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) has been one of the most 
successful pieces of civil rights legislation in American history.  En-
acted at the height of the Civil Rights Movement, the VRA helped 
achieve, in just a few years, a level of meaningful black enfranchise-
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ment in the South that had seemed impossible for nearly a hundred 
years since the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion. 
Indispensable to the VRA’s success is Section 5.1  This provision 
was specifically designed to extend the protections of the VRA into 
those states and jurisdictions that most obstinately clung to discrimi-
natory practices.  To achieve this end, Section 5 turned the tables on 
those jurisdictions deemed to be the worst offenders, essentially cre-
ating the presumption that any change in voting practices or proce-
dures, however minor, was racially discriminatory.  In order to effect 
any change in election practices, the jurisdiction had to overcome 
this presumption by “preclearing” the change with federal authori-
ties. 
Though initially intended to be a temporary measure, Congress 
extended and amended the VRA four times.2  It withstood a number 
of challenges to its constitutionality in the United States Supreme 
Court.3  Then, in November 2012, the Court granted certiorari on the 
question of whether the 2006 reauthorization exceeded Congress’s 
authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.4  One of 
the great unresolved questions was what standard of review the Court 
would apply to legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s power to 
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.  Previously, the Court had specifi-
cally avoided specifying the correct standard,5 but the Court of Ap-
peals stated that its reading of Supreme Court precedent “send[s] a 
 
 1 To avoid confusion, this Article will refer to sections of the VRA with the word “Section” 
written out, and sections of constitutional amendments with the § symbol.  For example, 
“Section 5” refers to a portion of the VRA, while “§ 5” refers to U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§ 5.  In addition, statutes and their sections are referred to by their conventional names, 
with citations to the codified statute provided in footnotes where helpful.  Thus, quota-
tions from Section 5 will be cited to 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
 2 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 855–56 (D.C. Cir. 2012)(discussing Congress’s 
revisions to the Voting Rights Act since its passage in 1965). 
 3 See Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 269 (1999) (holding that the Voting Rights 
Act’s requirements are applicable to changes made in a “noncovered State” if those 
changes will have an effect on changes made in a “covered county”); City of Rome v. 
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172 (1980) (holding that Congress “plainly intended” that a 
voting procedure not be granted preclearance unless it lacked both discriminatory pur-
pose and effect); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531–35 (1973) (holding that re-
apportionment changes that could have the effect of decreasing minority voting power 
constitute “practices” that are subject to Section 5 protection); South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding Section 5 and other sections of the Voting Rights 
Act against a constitutional challenge). 
 4 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
 5 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009) (noting that 
the “question [of the proper standard of review] has been extensively briefed in this case, 
but we need not resolve it”). 
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powerful signal that congruence and proportionality is the appropri-
ate standard of review.”6  “Congruence and proportionality” is the 
well-established standard for evaluating federal legislation enacted 
pursuant to Congress’s power to enforce the protections of the Four-
teenth Amendment.7  The Voting Rights Act, however, was enacted 
first and foremost under the Fifteenth Amendment.8  Moreover, 
shortly after the VRA was first enacted, the Court upheld Section 5 
under a standard that found congressional power to use “any rational 
means” to enforce the Amendment.9 
In its decision in Shelby County, however, the Court avoided the 
question of the standard of review applicable to Fifteenth Amend-
ment legislation.  Rather than determining the constitutionality of 
preclearance itself, the Court struck down the coverage formula, Sec-
tion 4(b), which determined which states and jurisdictions would be 
required to submit changes in election practices for preclearance by 
federal authorities.10  In so doing, the Court relied on a rather novel 
principle of the states’ “equal sovereignty.”11  But in striking down the 
coverage formula, the Court specifically declined to invalidate the 
preclearance procedures of Section 5 itself, and indeed invited Con-
gress to enact another coverage formula based on more current con-
ditions.12  Whether or not Congress does so, the Shelby County Court 
specifically reserved the question of the constitutionality of Section 5, 
but implied that such a determination might be appropriate in some 
future case.13 
 
 6 Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 859.  Though divided 2 to 1 on the constitutionality of the pre-
clearance regime, the three circuit judges agreed on the applicable standard.  See id. at 
885 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 7 See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003); Bd. of Trustees of Univ. 
of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81–
83 (2000).  
 8 There is significant overlap, of course, in Congress’s enforcement powers under the two 
amendments, and the Voting Rights Act might conceivably be held constitutional under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s enforcement power, the Fifteenth’s, both, or neither.  This 
Article will argue, however, that it is not a foregone conclusion that the two amendments 
grant Congress powers that must be evaluated under the same standard.  Moreover, it is 
obvious that to be constitutional, legislation need only fall within the scope of one en-
forcement clause or the other.  The question is therefore really whether the enactment of 
Section 5 exceeded Congress’s power under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment, 
and the question of the appropriate standard is relevant. 
 9 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324. 
 10 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 11 Id. at 2623. 
 12 See id. at 2631 (“Such a formula . . . justif[ies] such an ‘extraordinary departure from the 
traditional course of relations between the States and the Federal Government.’” (citation 
omitted)).  
 13 Id. (“We issue no holding on § 5 itself . . . .”). 
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This Article will argue that, if and when the Court revisits this ar-
ea, it should decline to take the remarkable (if not unexpected) step 
of subjecting legislation enacted pursuant to § 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment to more than rationality review.  Indeed, based on the 
history and subject matter of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments, the standard of review the Court applies to Fifteenth Amend-
ment legislation ought to be significantly more deferential.  Part I will 
examine relevant background, including a historical summary of the 
adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments, the passage of the 
VRA, and the subsequent effects of the Act’s implementation.  Part II 
will argue that, in the first place, there is no reason why the similari-
ties in the two amendments’ enforcement clauses must necessarily 
lead to identical congressional enforcement powers.  Part III adopts a 
more doctrinal approach and argues that the Supreme Court has not, 
in fact, ever applied the current Fourteenth Amendment standard to 
Section 5.  Part IV will take the position that, because the subject mat-
ter of the Fifteenth Amendment is so much narrower than that of the 
Fourteenth, the Court may grant more deference to Congress in en-
forcing it.  Moreover, to prevent the Fifteenth Amendment from be-
ing swallowed by the Fourteenth, the Court should decline to con-
flate the applicable standards of review. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Fourteenth & Fifteenth Amendments 
Following the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment14 in De-
cember 1865, the attention of Republicans in Congress turned to-
wards establishing civil rights for the newly freed blacks.  The Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 was passed over President Andrew Johnson’s veto15 
and gave all persons in the United States the same rights as whites to 
enter into contracts, to sue, and the like.16  Two years later, in 1868, 
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.  Although this granted citi-
 
 14 The Thirteenth Amendment provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall 
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIII, § 1. 
 15 See EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869, at 70 
(1990) (providing a historical account of the circumstances surrounding the passage of 
the Civil Rights Bill of 1866). 
 16 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), (b) (2006) (providing a guarantee of equal rights to “[a]ll per-
sons within the jurisdiction of the United States” including the equal right “to make and 
enforce contracts”).  
May 2014] VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1481 
 
zenship to former slaves, the evidence suggests that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not understood or intended by its framers to guar-
antee black suffrage.17  For one thing, a proposal dealing with the 
right to vote was rejected at the last minute and replaced with a provi-
sion adjusting congressional representation based on population.18  
For another, the provision most likely to grant suffrage, the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause,19 would have done so only if the franchise was 
understood as a fundamental right of all citizens and not a creation 
of state law, a view that was, at best, controversial at the time.20  Thus, 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment left the question of 
black suffrage unresolved.21  However, Congress began to mandate 
black suffrage in areas it deemed politically safe, including the Dis-
trict of Columbia, federal territories, and the former Confederacy as 
a condition of readmission to the Union.22 
Shortly after the election of 1868, a consensus began to develop 
among Republicans in Congress that a constitutional amendment 
should be drafted to finally settle the issue of black suffrage.23  
Though some radical Republicans argued that authority to ensure 
that former slaves had the right to vote existed pursuant to Con-
gress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, moderate Republicans and Democrats did not agree.24  In 
drafting the Amendment, the debate concerned mostly its scope, in-
cluding concerns that an amendment prohibiting the denial of vot-
ing rights on the basis of race alone would leave states free to effec-
tively deny the vote on facially race-neutral grounds.25  Nevertheless, 
 
 17 MALTZ, supra note 15, at 118–20. 
 18 Id. at 118; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 , cl. 1 (modifying the “three-fifths” provi-
sion of Article I, § 2 by “counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
Indians not taxed”). 
 19 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 20 Cf. MALTZ, supra note 15, at 118–19 (quoting Jacob Howard as saying that the right to 
vote “has always been regarded in this country as the result of positive local law, not re-
garded as one of those fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society”). 
 21 For a discussion of the developments in black suffrage between the passage of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments, see generally id. at 121–41. 
 22 DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 29 (5th ed. 
2012). 
 23 See MALTZ, supra note 15, at 142–45 (“Within weeks of the [1868] election, representatives 
from a variety of viewpoints within the Republican party renewed the call for a constitu-
tional amendment to finally settle the suffrage issue.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 24 See id. at 147 (“Both Democrats and more moderate Republicans rose to challenge the 
assertion that Congress had authority to regulate suffrage without a constitutional 
amendment.”).  
 25 See id. (“As Samuel Shellabarger pointed out, a mere requirement of impartial suffrage 
could be easily circumvented; imposition of rece-neutral criteria such as property or edu-
cation could effectively disfranchise most blacks, particularly in the former slave states.”). 
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the more moderate and conservative forces in Congress forced a 
compromise, while radical Republicans accepted the narrower lan-
guage as better than nothing.26  In the end, the Amendment as 
adopted provided that the right to vote could not be “denied or 
abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude”27 and that “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.”28  It is worth noting that the framers of the 
Fifteenth Amendment not only “intend[ed] to leave untouched those 
qualifications that have a racially disproportionate impact; even those 
qualifications that [were] intended to disfranchise blacks were pur-
posefully left intact.”29 
B.  The Voting Rights Act of 1965 
It goes virtually without saying that the results of the Fifteenth 
Amendment fell woefully short in terms of actually enabling blacks to 
cast a vote.  The Fifteenth Amendment was “de facto repealed, for all 
practical purposes, in the South” and became “the most willfully ig-
nored [amendment] in constitutional history.”30  The disparity be-
tween the promise of the Fifteenth Amendment and the realities of 
the post-Reconstruction South was a result of the very compromise 
that made the Amendment’s passage possible, that is, by the continu-
ing permissibility of voting requirements that were facially neutral 
even if intentionally discriminatory.  The familiar litany of legal devices 
used to thwart black voting—secret ballots, poll taxes, literacy tests, 
grandfather clauses—was of course augmented by outright fraud and 
violent intimidation.31  The result was that in 1965, just prior to the 
enactment of the VRA, and nearly a century after the passage of the 
Fifteenth Amendment, black voter registration in the seven states 
 
 26 See id. at 155 (noting that “conservative Republicans forced more radical party members 
to accept a very narrow formulation of the suffrage amendment”). 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 28 Id. § 2. 
 29 MALTZ, supra note 15, at 156 (emphasis omitted). 
 30 Richard H. Pildes, Introduction to THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT xi, xii (David L. 
Epstein et al. eds., 2006). 
 31 See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 30–32 (describing various “disfranchisement” 
devices and voting rights legislation). 
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soon-to-be covered by Section 5 was 29.3%.32  In Mississippi, it was 
6.7%.33 
A series of civil rights demonstrations demanding voting rights 
came to a head in a brutal crackdown on demonstrators by state 
troopers in Selma, Alabama on March 7, 1965.34  Just days later, Pres-
ident Lyndon Johnson proposed the Voting Rights Act, which he 
signed into law on August 6.35  The new law contained several provi-
sions meant to address the dramatic inequities in voting.  Section 2, 
when originally passed, essentially reiterated the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, and plaintiffs could challenge a discriminatory voting scheme 
either under Section 2 or under the Constitution itself.36  Other pro-
visions, however, targeted those jurisdictions deemed to be the worst 
offenders against black voting rights.  Section 4 placed more strin-
gent restrictions on those jurisdictions that “maintained on Novem-
ber 1, 1964, any test or device,” such as a literacy or educational test, 
or which had less than fifty percent voter registration or participation 
in the 1964 election.37  According to the Court of Appeals in Shelby 
County, “Congress chose these criteria carefully. It knew precisely 
which states it sought to cover and crafted the criteria to capture 
those jurisdictions.”38  Since the coverage formula “could be both 
over- and under-inclusive,” Congress included procedures to remove 
a jurisdiction (“bailout”) as well as to capture additional jurisdictions 
and subject them to coverage (“bail-in”).39 
What really made the VRA, in the words of President Johnson, the 
“goddamnedest toughest” law the Attorney General could come up 
with40 was the preclearance requirement of Section 5.  Case-by-case 
litigation had “done little to cure the problem of voting discrimina-
tion”41 in the face of “unremitting and ingenious defiance” of the Fif-
 
 32 Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act:  A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY 
VOTING:  THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7, 21 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler 
Davidson eds., 1992) (discussing the South’s response to the Voting Rights Act and the 
changes in black voter registration). 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. at 16 (detailing the events of Bloody Sunday, the civil rights march on March 7, 
1965 that demanded increased voting rights). 
 35 Id. at 16–17. 
 36 See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 202.  Section 2 is now codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973 (2006). 
 37 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2006). 
 38 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 855 (2012). 
 39 Id.  The requirements for bailout are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)–(F) (2006).  
The bail-in provision is codified at § 1973a(c). 
 40 Davidson, supra note 32, at 17. 
 41 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966). 
1484 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:5 
 
teenth Amendment on the part of much of the country.42  Section 5 
shifted the burden of proof by requiring preclearance of any change 
in a voting “standard, practice, or procedure”43 in the jurisdictions 
covered by Section 4.  The Attorney General (or a three-judge panel 
of the District Court for the District of D.C.) must determine that the 
change has neither the “purpose nor . . . effect of denying or abridg-
ing the right to vote on account of race or color, or” on the basis of 
membership in a language minority group.44 
C.  Subsequent History 
Almost as soon as it was enacted, the constitutionality of Section 5 
was challenged in the United States Supreme Court.  In upholding 
the law, the Court made the following finding: 
The language and purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment, the prior deci-
sions construing its several provisions, and the general doctrines of con-
stitutional interpretation, all point to one fundamental principle.  As 
against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational 
means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimina-
tion in voting.45 
Although the Court stated that this test “is the same as in all cases 
concerning the express powers of Congress with relation to the re-
served powers of the States,” including those under each of the en-
forcement clauses of the Reconstruction amendments,46 South Caroli-
na v. Katzenbach nevertheless clearly articulated a standard of review 
for Fifteenth Amendment legislation that the Court did not explicitly 
call into question for over forty years.47 
The scope of congressional power to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment was further clarified in Allen v. State Board of Elections,48 
which addressed the issue of whether Section 5 applies only to the 
core right to cast a ballot or extends to other changes in practices re-
lated to voting.49  The Court explained that the VRA “gives a broad 
interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing that voting includes 
 
 42 Id. at 309. 
 43 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324. 
 46 Id. at 326. 
 47 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009).  
 48 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
 49 Id. at 550. Among the proposed changes was a change from election of members of a 
county board of supervisors from single-member districts to at-large.  Id. Another pro-
posal was to change the position of an education superintendent from elected to ap-
pointed.  Id. at 550–51. 
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‘all action necessary to make a vote effective.’”50  Congress’s decision 
to extend the VRA in 1970, without adding language contrary to the 
holding in Allen, is arguably a “ratification of that decision.”51 
It is difficult to overstate the Voting Rights Act’s success in extend-
ing de facto voting rights to blacks.  “The act simply overwhelmed the 
major bulwarks of the disenfranchising system” and, in the covered 
states, led to a near doubling in the black voter registration rate to 
56.6% by 1972.52  Since it was enacted, Congress has extended the 
VRA four times, most recently in 2006 for twenty-five years.53  Though 
in most respects the coverage formula has remained unchanged since 
1965,54 it was extended in the 1975 amendments to those jurisdictions 
that “provided any registration or voting [materials] . . . only in the 
English language” and where more than five percent of voting-age 
citizens “are members of a single language minority.”55  The goal of 
this change was to extend coverage to Texas, which despite its history 
of voting discrimination against Spanish-speakers, had never used an 
actual literacy test and thus was not included under the prior cover-
age formula.56  Before the decision in Shelby County, the jurisdictions 
covered by Section 4 included the entirety of the states of Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, 
Texas, and Virginia, as well as parts of California, Florida, Michigan, 
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota.57 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has withstood several attacks on 
its constitutionality over the years.58  In 2009, however, the Supreme 
Court heard a case that directly called the 2006 extension of Section 
5 into question.  In Northwest Austin Municipal District Number One v. 
Holder, the appellant was a utility district that sought bailout from the 
preclearance requirement of Section 5 or, in the alternative, a find-
 
 50 Id. at 565–66 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(1) (2006)). 
 51 LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 168; see also Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 
533 (1973) (“Had Congress disagreed with the interpretation of [Section] 5 in Allen, it 
had ample opportunity to amend the statute.”). 
 52 Davidson, supra note 32, at 21. 
 53 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 855–56 (2012). 
 54 Id. at 855 (comparing Section 4 as it currently exists with its original version). 
 55 Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973b(f)(3)(2006)). 
 56 See JAMES THOMAS TUCKER, THE BATTLE OVER BILINGUAL BALLOTS: LANGUAGE 
MINORITIES AND POLITICAL ACCESS UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 58 (2009) (discussing 
the myriad of methods the Texan government used to disenfranchise Spanish-speakers, 
and the consequent expansion of Section 4 to prevent this discrimination). 
 57 See Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
 58 See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999); City of Rome v. United States, 446 
U.S. 156 (1980). 
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ing that Section 5 was unconstitutional.59  The Court held that the 
district was entitled to bailout, thus avoiding the constitutional ques-
tion.60 
The Northwest Austin Court engaged in what was arguably an “act 
of statesmanship”61 in avoiding the constitutional question.  Professor 
Richard Hasen views the case as “a questionable application of the 
doctrine”62 made possible by a “conspiracy of silence on the Court” in 
which no Justice, not even the partially-dissenting Justice Clarence 
Thomas, questioned the analysis.63  He suggests that the medicine of 
drastic constitutional change “goes down more palatably when in 
small doses.”64  A perhaps less cynical view is that the Court intended 
to send a signal to Congress that it needed to make changes to the 
VRA.  According to Professor Ellen Katz, the “Court structured its 
opinion to encourage, to prod, and—almost certainly—to require 
Congress to act.”65  Nevertheless, “Congress has shown no inclination 
to consider amending Section 5 since [Northwest Austin] came 
down.”66  In the meantime, of course, the Court decided to hear a 
case in which the question of Section 5’s constitutionality was una-
voidable. 
In stopping short of ruling on Section 5’s constitutionality in 
Northwest Austin the Court also did not say what standard of review 
should apply when determining whether Congress acts under the en-
forcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment.67  Nevertheless, the 
Court presented two options.  The first possibility is the “congruence 
and proportionality” standard borrowed from the Court’s Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence.68  The other possibility comes from the 
case in which the Court first upheld Section 5, and would require 
“that the legislation be a ‘rational means to effectuate the constitu-
 
 59 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009). 
 60 See id. 
 61 Adam Liptak, Justices Retain Oversight by U.S. on Voting Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at 
A1. 
 62 Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. 
CT. REV. 181, 181 (2009). 
 63 Id. at 206. 
 64 Id. at 223. 
 65 Ellen D. Katz, From Bush v. Gore to NAMUDNO:  A Response to Professor Amar, 61 FLA. L. 
REV. 991, 999 (2009); see also Stuart Taylor, Judicial Statesmanship on Voting Rights, NAT’L 
JOURNAL, June 27, 2009, at 13 (arguing that the Northwest Austin Court has “sent Congress 
a clear message:  Fix the constitutional problems, or Section 5 may be doomed”). 
 66 LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 201. 
 67 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009). 
 68 See id. (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). 
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tional prohibition.’”69  According to the Court, however, the preclear-
ance requirements and the coverage formula raise serious constitu-
tional questions under either test.”70 
In Shelby County, the case decided by the Court last term, the peti-
tioner, Shelby County, Alabama, had been subject to preclearance 
since the VRA was enacted in 1965.71  The County argued that, unlike 
the plaintiff in Northwest Austin, it was ineligible for bailout because of 
a 2008 objection by the Justice Department to a redistricting plan 
submitted by a city within its borders.72  The County therefore sought 
“a declaration that Section 5 [is] . . . facially unconstitutional, as well 
as a permanent injunction prohibiting” its enforcement.73  Both the 
district court and the court of appeals found for the Attorney General 
and upheld Section 5.74  Interestingly, however, the two courts took 
distinct approaches to the question of the standard of review to apply 
in making this determination. 
Rather than finding that two distinct standards apply in Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement cases, or that the 
Boerne standard has superseded Katzenbach, the district court argued 
that Boerne represents a “refined version of the same method of analy-
sis utilized in Katzenbach.”75  The court of appeals, by contrast, “read 
Northwest Austin as sending a powerful signal that congruence and 
proportionality [i.e., Boerne] is the appropriate standard” for legisla-
tion enacted under the Fifteenth Amendment.76  Though this is the 
standard the court applied, it stopped just short of holding definitive-
ly that this is the correct standard, since Boerne is “arguably more rig-
orous” than the “any rational means” standard of Katzenbach.77 Thus, 
though the court of appeals did not conflate the standards as did the 
district court, it reasoned that since Section 5 would survive Boerne, it 
would also survive Katzenbach.78  In this way, the court applied Boerne 
while managing to avoid choosing a standard. 
 
 69 Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 442 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 72 See id. at 443; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(E) (2006) (permitting bailout only to those 
jurisdictions for which “the Attorney General has not interposed any objection”). 
 73 Shelby Cnty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 443. 
 74 Id. at 428; Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 75 Shelby Cnty., 811 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
 76 Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 859. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. The D.C. Circuit upheld Section 5 over the dissent of Judge Stephen Williams.  De-
spite their disagreement over the outcome, both the majority and dissent were in agree-
ment that Northwest Austin indicates that the Boerne standard should apply.  See id. at 885 
(Williams, J., dissenting). 
1488 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:5 
 
In a surprising turn of events, however, the Supreme Court took a 
somewhat different tack, and once again did not resolve the issue of 
what standard of review applies.  Rather than tackling the constitu-
tionality of Section 5, the Court instead voided the coverage formula 
on the grounds that it offended the “‘equal sovereignty’ among the 
states,” a doctrine which seems to have originated in dicta three years 
earlier in Northwest Austin.79  The Court, in explaining why it issued no 
holding on Section 5 itself, invited Congress to “draft another formu-
la based on current conditions”80 and stated that such a formula 
would be “an initial prerequisite to a determination that exceptional 
conditions still exist” to justify preclearance at all.81 
Whether Congress will accept this invitation is a question of no 
small moment, although some commentators have argued that the 
political will to do so is unlikely to materialize.82  Nevertheless, Shelby 
County specifically reserved the question of the constitutionality of 
Section 5, but implied that such a determination might be appropri-
ate in some future case.83  What is clear, however, is that notwithstand-
ing the readiness of the lower courts to apply Boerne to legislation en-
forcing the Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court itself has 
never stated with definiteness whether the legislation enacted by 
Congress pursuant to the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments are to be analyzed under the same standard 
of review.  When and if the Court does make such a ruling it will rep-
resent an important doctrinal development.  The remainder of this 
Article argues that such a ruling would be a mistake. 
 
 79 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 
One v. Holder 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2008)); see also Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-
Existent Principle of State Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 24, 24 (2013) (arguing that the 
doctrine of equal sovereignty is both unjustified and without basis in precedent).  Inter-
estingly, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in dissent, perceived that the equal sovereignty 
analysis does in fact amount to a kind of heightened scrutiny by imposing a “double bur-
den” requiring the government to show both “a need for continuing the preclearance re-
gime in covered States” and also “to disprove the existence of a comparable need else-
where.”  Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Nevertheless, the Court 
did not present its analysis in conventional standard-of-review terms. 
 80 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Void Oversight of States, Issue at Heart of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2013, at A1 (asserting that most analysts agree that “the chances that the 
current Congress could reach agreement on where federal oversight is required are 
small”). 
 83 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
May 2014] VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1489 
 
II.  THE POSSIBILITY OF DISTINCT STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The threshold question in the Article’s analysis is whether it is 
even possible, as a matter of either logic or of constitutional construc-
tion, for the scope of congressional power under the enforcement 
clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to differ.  The 
answer to this question is not immediately obvious.  This Part will ar-
gue, notwithstanding a superficial similarity in language, that the very 
different substantial guarantees of the respective amendments may 
plausibly give rise to significant differences in Congress’s power to 
enforce those guarantees. 
Of course, one argument for applying the same standard of review 
for legislation under the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments (and, for that matter, the Thirteenth) is that 
the clauses share virtually identical language.84  Indeed, this has been 
accepted as compelling evidence by several courts that the congres-
sional powers are identical (or very nearly so) under each clause.  
This was one of the reasons, for example, given by the district court 
in Shelby County.85  The district court also cites decisions from the 
courts of appeals to support its position.  For example, in finding that 
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under both the Fif-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that 
there was “no reason to treat the enforcement provision of the Fif-
teenth Amendment differently than the identical provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”86  In addition to the courts, some scholarly 
commentaries have predicted that the Court would likely apply the 
same analysis to legislation enacted to enforce the guarantees of the-
se two amendments.  Professor Pamela Karlan, for example, has 
pointed out that the Court has already muddied the distinction be-
tween the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement pow-
ers, probably on the basis that “the two amendments are rough con-
 
 84 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 
(“The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”); 
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.”). 
 85 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 449–50 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting “the nearly 
identical language and similar origin of these two Reconstruction Amendments” seeming-
ly provides “‘no reason to treat the enforcement provision of the Fifteenth Amendment 
differently than the identical provision of the Fourteenth Amendment’” (internal cita-
tions omitted)). 
 86 Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 399 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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temporaries and their enforcement power provisions are articulated 
in similar terms . . . .”87 
The assumption that these distinct grants of authority comprise 
the same scope, however, is questionable in light of the different ways 
the Court has defined the Reconstruction Amendments enforcement 
powers in other areas.  For example, there is a marked contrast in the 
ability of Congress to regulate private conduct under the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the 
Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 “bars all racial discrimination, private 
as well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and . . . is a valid ex-
ercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.”88  Several subsequent cases further upheld Congress’s right to 
regulate private behavior under the enforcement clause of the Thir-
teenth Amendment.89  By contrast, regulation of private conduct falls 
outside Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power un-
der current law.  In United States v. Morrison, the Court held that Con-
gress’s enactment of a private remedy for gender-motivated violence 
exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment powers.90 
Of course, the discrepancy in the scope of the enforcement pow-
ers under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot possi-
bly derive from the superficial difference in the wording of § 2 of the 
former and § 5 of the latter.  Rather, the difference stems from each 
amendment’s underlying substantive guarantees that Congress might 
seek to enforce.  In the case of the Thirteenth Amendment, this was 
the power to “abolish[] all badges and incidents of slavery in the 
United States” no matter their source.91  The Fourteenth, meanwhile, 
specifically frames its provisions as restrictions on actions of the 
states.92  Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action require-
 
 87 Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives:  Voting Rights and Remedies After 
Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 726 n.5 (1998); see also infra notes 101–103 and ac-
companying text. 
 88 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (emphasis added). 
 89 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 166, 186 (1976) (holding that § 1981 prohibits pri-
vate schools from refusing to accept black students); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 
106–07 (1971) (holding that § 1985 permits suits for private conspiracies to deter the ex-
ercise of civil rights). 
 90 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
 91 Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)). 
 92 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).  
Similarly, the Fifteenth Amendment’s substantive guarantees include an explicit state ac-
tion requirement.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The rights of citizens of the United 
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by . . . any State on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude.”). 
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ment sets a limit on its effectiveness that the Thirteenth Amendment 
does not impose.”93  This limitation, naturally, carries into the subse-
quent conferral of power to enforce the underlying substance of the 
amendment. 
The conclusion we can draw from this example, then, agrees with 
a logical reading of the enforcement clauses.  Because the enforce-
ment clauses grant Congress the power to “enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation,”94 the scope of the enforcement power, that is, 
what legislation is appropriate, must be tied to the nature of the 
amendment’s underlying substantive guarantees.  Logically, then, to 
the extent that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments differ in 
their substantive guarantees, they may also differ in their grant of 
congressional enforcement powers.  Furthermore, the nearly identi-
cal language of the enforcement clauses need not lead a priori to the 
conclusion that the scope of congressional power is identical under 
each.  Whether an analogous difference in the enforcement powers 
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments exists, based on 
those amendments’ underlying subject matter, is an important ques-
tion.  More important still, for the purposes of this Article, is whether 
such a difference might plausibly give rise to different standards of 
review. 
III.  THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS 
A.  Boerne and the New Federalism 
City of Boerne v. Flores95 is the seminal case in the Supreme Court’s 
current line of § 5 jurisprudence.  In Boerne, the Court invalidated the 
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),96 holding 
that it exceeded Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth 
 
 93 Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom:  Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 
B.C. L. REV. 307, 361 (2004); see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 927 (3d ed., 2000) (stating that “Congress is free, within the broad limits of reason, 
to recognize whatever rights it wishes, define the infringement of those rights as a form of 
domination or subordination and thus an aspect of slavery, and proscribe such infringe-
ment as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment”). 
 94 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (emphasis added). 
 95 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 96 According to the Boerne Court, “RFRA prohibits ‘[g]overnment’ from ‘substantially bur-
den[ing]’ a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden ‘(1) is in furtherance of 
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling governmental interest.’”  Id. at 515–16 (internal citations omitted). 
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Amendment.97  In so doing, the Court found that Congress’s power 
was “remedial” rather than “substantive,”98 meaning that Congress 
“has been given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine 
what constitutes a constitutional violation.”99  The Court then exam-
ined RFRA under a new standard of review:  “there must be a con-
gruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved.”100  In-
terestingly, the Court illustrated this principle with reference to the 
VRA, pointing out that the record of voting rights abuses confronting 
Congress in 1965 was vastly more extensive than the record of reli-
gious discrimination purported to justify RFRA.101  In addition, the 
Court cited the geographical limitations of Section 5 as evidence of 
the VRA’s proportionality.102  The district court in Shelby County, for 
one, interpreted this—along with Boerne’s reliance on several Section 
5 cases—to mean that Boerne is “best read to mean that the nature of 
Congress’s enforcement powers under the two amendments is the 
same.”103 
Underlying Boerne, however, is the imperative to preserve the sub-
ordination of Congress to the Constitution by constraining Con-
gress’s ability to “define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s meaning . . . .”104  Indeed, Boerne helped launch what 
has been characterized as a “federalism revolution”105 in which the 
Court has placed limits on congressional power under two constitu-
tional provisions in particular.  First, of course, is § 5.  Boerne was fol-
lowed by a line of cases dealing with congressional power to enforce 
the Equal Protection Clause by abrogating sovereign immunity en-
joyed by the states under the Eleventh Amendment.  To simplify 
somewhat, the result of these cases is that Congress’s power to enact 
an antidiscrimination measure increases with the level of judicial 
scrutiny that would be applied to the discrimination the measure 
seeks to prevent.106  For example, in University of Alabama v. Garrett, the 
 
 97 Id. at 536 (“Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of 
powers and the federal balance.”). 
 98 See id. at 520. 
 99 Id. at 519. 
100 Id. at 530. 
101 See id. (comparing RFRA and the VRA). 
102 See id. at 533 (describing the geographic restrictions of the VRA). 
103 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 458 (D.D.C. 2011). 
104 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529. 
105 Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew Preclearance Provisions, in THE FUTURE OF 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 81, 85 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006). 
106 See id. at 95–96 (“The Court noted that a higher level of scrutiny applies in assessing the 
constitutionality of legislation that discriminates on the basis of gender . . . compared to 
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Court held that a state cannot be sued for violating the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.107  Two years later, in Nevada Department of Hu-
man Resources v. Hibbs, the Court upheld the provision of the Family 
and Medical Leave Act permitting suits against state governments.108  
The Court explicitly acknowledged that the disparate outcomes re-
sulted from the different standards of review for discrimination on 
the basis of disability and sex.109  The Court noted that “[b]ecause the 
standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based 
classification is more difficult to meet than our rational-basis 
test . . . it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitu-
tional violations.”110  By adjusting the evidentiary burden on Congress 
to justify antidiscrimination legislation according to the standards 
applied “[u]nder . . . equal protection case law,”111 the Court rein-
forces the underlying purpose of Boerne to prohibit Congress from us-
ing its § 5 power to “determine what constitutes a constitutional viola-
tion”112 and reasserts the role of the judiciary as the sole interpreter of 
the Amendment’s meaning.113 
Boerne is just one significant case in a trend in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence that has been called “New Federalism.”114  This 
trend has led to a significant shift in the balance of power from the 
federal government to the states.115  In addition to the limitations on 
§ 5 power imposed by Boerne, congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause,116 too, has been curtailed.  The Court’s decision in 
Morrison, in addition to dealing with § 5, also brought the commerce 
power within what the Court called “effective bounds.”117  More re-
 
the rational basis level of scrutiny that applies in assessing the constitutionality of legisla-
tion that discriminates on the basis of age . . . or disability . . . .”). 
107 Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001). 
108 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003). 
109 See id. at 735–36. 
110 Id. at 736.  The Court also noted the constitutionality of the VRA and linked it to the 
heightened scrutiny associated with racial classifications.  Id. 
111 Id. at 735. 
112 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
113 See id. at 524 (“The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains 
in the Judiciary.”). 
114 Hasen, supra note 105, at 85.  For a larger discussion of this shift in the Court’s jurispru-
dence, see generally MARK  TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003). 
115 See Hasen, supra note 105, at 85 (describing new federalism as a “seisemic shift in power 
from the federal government to the states”). 
116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
117 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000).  In Morrison, the Court evaluated a 
statute in light of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and, in the alternative, 
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 619. 
1494 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:5 
 
cently, while upholding the individual mandate in the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act, the Court explicitly found that the law 
exceeded the congressional power under the Commerce Clause.118  
As in the § 5 cases, these checks are remarkable precisely because 
they limit Congress’s power under a provision “previously thought to 
be virtually limitless.”119 
The question, then, is whether constraints imposed by the Court’s 
new federalism on congressional power in commerce and § 5 areas 
might similarly constrain Congress in the area of enforcing the Fif-
teenth Amendment.  It goes without saying that a crucial—perhaps 
the most crucial—task of the Supreme Court is to flesh out the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment’s rather vague guarantees of equal 
protection and due process.  Likewise, the commerce power may be, 
and has been, used to enact all manner of legislation.  The Court’s 
new federalism decisions may be fairly read as an attempt to rein in 
these powers, lest they become plenary.  The Fifteenth Amendment, 
however, poses no such risk:  its subject matter is far narrower than 
that of the Fourteenth, and its terms are much less vague.120  Strict ju-
dicial constraints seem unnecessary for an enforcement power nar-
rowly focused on guaranteeing voting rights regardless of race.  As 
Professor Evan Caminker puts it, 
[t]he ends authorized by [§ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment] are far more 
constrained than those authorized by [§ 5 of the Fourteenth]; whereas 
the latter touch upon a wide variety of liberty and property interests in a 
wide variety of contexts, the former focus exclusively on voting rights.  
For this reason, [§] 2 could not possibly give rise to a legitimate fear that, 
if construed to require only McCulloch-style means-ends tailoring, it would 
functionally award Congress a virtually plenary police power.121 
Thus, it seems that, notwithstanding Boerne’s nominal reliance on the 
VRA and associated cases, its underlying reasoning does not really 
apply to Fifteenth Amendment legislation.  Absent an explicit equiva-
lence between the two standards, it is likely that Boerne’s approving 
discussion of the VRA was meant to be illustrative of a statute that 
 
118 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012). 
119 Hasen, supra note 105, at 85; see also Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (acknowledging the com-
merce power’s “expansive scope” and the varied uses to which Congress has put it). 
120 See Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 61, 91 n.126 (2000) (“[U]nlike the Fourteenth Amendment [§] 5 power, the power 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment does not pose a risk of becoming a plenary power.  
The Fifteenth Amendment is limited to a much narrower subject  matter—race discrimi-
nating in voting—than the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
121 Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1127, 1190–91 (2001).  Neverthless, Caminker concedes that “Boerne strongly sug-
gests” that § 2 measures are subject to the same standard of review.  Id. at 1191. 
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would meet the congruence and proportionality standard if it had 
to.122  The mere fact that the VRA does meet the Boerne standard does 
not mean that it must.  Indeed, the Northwest Austin Court’s equivoca-
tion on this question123 ten years after Boerne makes this interpretation 
even more plausible. 
B.  Mobile, Rome, and the § 2 Enforcement Power 
While the Fifteenth Amendment thus falls outside the new feder-
alism rationale underlying the Boerne standard, an examination of the 
Supreme Court’s VRA jurisprudence indicates that the Court has in 
fact interpreted the § 2 power more broadly than § 5.  While Boerne 
aimed to restrict Congress’s ability to define the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s substantial guarantees,124 there is a pair of cases 
that when read together arguably suggests that Congress has power 
under § 2 to interpret the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment.  
The question in City of Mobile v. Bolden was whether at-large elections 
for city commissioners violated Section 2 of the VRA.125  The Court 
began by finding that Section 2 “was intended to have an effect no 
different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.”126  The Court 
upheld the election scheme, holding that the Fifteenth Amendment 
“prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment” of 
the right to vote,127 and that a discriminatory purpose had not been 
proven in this case.128  Decided on the same day as Mobile, City of Rome 
v. United States arose out of a Section 5 challenge to the city’s annexa-
tion of several areas and the resulting change in the racial composi-
tion of the electorate.129  Since the district court found a discriminato-
ry effect, but no discriminatory purpose, the city argued that Section 
5’s prohibition on changes that have a discriminatory effect exceed 
Congress’s power under the Fifteenth Amendment.130  The Court 
 
122 See id. at 1191 n.269 (acknowledging that the Boerne Court may have meant “to highlight 
the distinctions between a well-tailored and poorly tailored enforcement measure, with-
out meaning to hold that such well-tailoring is now a prerequisite for the constitutionality 
of Section 2 measures”). 
123 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009) (noting that 
the “question has been extensively briefed in this case, but we need not resolve it”). 
124 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
125 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980). 
126 Id. at 61. 
127 Id. at 65. 
128 See id. at 74 (“They are far from proof that the at-large electoral scheme represents pur-
poseful discrimination against Negro voters.”). 
129 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 161–62 (1980) (describing the challenged 
annexations). 
130 Id. at 172. 
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held, however, “that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress 
may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of 
the Amendment” subject to requirement that the prohibition be “ap-
propriate.”131  A broad side-by-side reading of these cases, then, indi-
cates that the Court was “authorizing Congress independently to in-
terpret the Fifteenth Amendment and even to adopt a view contrary 
to the Supreme Court.”132  So envisioned, Congress’s § 2 power is 
clearly much broader in scope than that envisioned by Boerne for the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In fact, the scope of Section 5 of the VRA (and thus the scope of 
Congress’s § 2 enforcement power) has long been acknowledged to 
extend beyond the narrow confines of prohibiting clear violations of 
the Fifteenth Amendment itself.  Of course, the core guarantee of the 
Fifteenth Amendment is the right to cast a ballot.  What proved to be 
a thornier issue, at least in the years immediately following the pas-
sage of the VRA, was whether Section 5 could extend to instances of 
vote dilution where blacks were able to vote but where their votes 
were rendered ineffective due to districting.133  In Allen v. State Board 
of Elections, the Supreme Court held that Section 5 “gives a broad in-
terpretation to the right to vote includ[ing] ‘all action necessary to 
make a vote effective.’”134  The Court’s decision transformed Section 5 
from a “little used” provision into a formidable “weapon to prevent 
minority vote dilution.”135  The extension of federal authority over 
election practices beyond registration and enfranchisement is a sig-
nificant expansion beyond the core of the Fifteenth Amendment.136  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has “[n]ever held that vote dilution vio-
 
131 Id. at 177.  In fact, Section 2 itself was subsequently amended in 1982, in response to Mo-
bile, to include a prohibition on election practices with discriminatory effects.  See Laugh-
lin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Representation, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING:  THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 66, 67–68 
(Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (“Congress responded overwhelm-
ingly [to Mobile] in 1982 by extending the preclearance provisions of section 5 for anoth-
er twenty-five years and amending section 2 to prohibit voting practices, regardless of 
their purpose, that result in discrimination.”). 
132 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 306 (4th ed., 
2011). 
133 See Davidson, supra note 32, at 27–28 (discussing challenges to voter dilution practices in 
the South). 
134 Allen v. State Bd. Of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1969) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973l(c)(1) (2006)). 
135 Davidson, supra note 32, at 28. 
136 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207–08 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that absent a finding of discrimination in registration, voting, or candidacy, the con-
gressional prohibition cannot “be characterized as enforcement of the Fourteenth or Fif-
teenth Amendment”). 
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lates the Fifteenth Amendment.”137  Congress has thus prohibited 
(with the Court’s approval) practices that lie far outside the Amend-
ment’s core guarantee of the right to cast a ballot regardless of race. 
Since the time of its enactment, then, the understanding of the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s scope has expanded, from prohibiting only 
facially discriminatory voting practices to forbidding any intentional 
abridgement of the right to vote.  Perhaps just as dramatically, the 
scope of Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power has 
grown to include not only direct violations of the Amendment itself, 
but also any discriminatory practice relating to elections, including 
districting, whether that practice is discriminatory on its face, in its 
purpose, or in its effect.  In the meantime, the Court has severely lim-
ited the power of Congress to act in other areas.  Most significantly 
for the purposes of this Article, the Court has limited the power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to those measures considered 
“congruent and proportional” as measured by a scheme intimately 
connected with the Court’s own standards of review in evaluating vio-
lations of the Amendment itself.138  An examination of the Court’s 
VRA jurisprudence reveals no such limitation imposed on the power 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.  Along the way, of course, both 
courts and legal scholars have assumed and argued that the enforce-
ment powers under the amendments are comparable or even identi-
cal.  Nevertheless, one thing that is clear after both Northwest Austin 
and Shelby County is that the applicability of the Boerne standard to the 
Fifteenth Amendment legislation remains unresolved.139 
IV.  THE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT STANDARDS 
Thus far, this Article has advanced two main arguments.  First, it 
has argued that there is no reason why the constitutionality of legisla-
tion enacted under the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments, as a matter of logic, must be evaluated under 
identical standards.  Rather, each amendment’s enforcement power 
is derived from the underlying prohibition Congress may seek to en-
force, and differences in the content, breadth, and specificity of the 
 
137 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Reno v. Bossier Parish 
Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 334 n.3 (2000)). 
138 See supra notes 101–109 and accompanying text. 
139 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009) (declining to 
decide upon the standard of review to apply in the case); see also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 
133 S. Ct. 2612, 2638 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Today’s Court does not purport 
to alter settled precedent establishing that the dispositive question is whether Congress 
has employed ‘rational means.’”). 
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amendments may significantly affect their attending enforcement 
powers.  Second, this Article has contrasted the case law surrounding 
legislation enacted pursuant to each amendment’s enforcement 
power and found that, as a doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court has 
treated them very differently.  Furthermore, the likely reasons for the 
stricter limitation on the Fourteenth Amendment legislation do not 
apply readily to the Fifteenth Amendment, which is far more con-
fined in its subject matter and purpose.  As this Part will argue, the 
Court should maintain separate standards for Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendment enforcement legislation.  Failing to do so would 
endanger the continuing vitality of the Fifteenth Amendment. 
A.  Historical Perspective 
In granting Shelby County’s petition for certiorari, the Supreme 
Court took the unusual step of modifying the wording of the question 
presented.  While the petitioner asked only whether Section 5 ex-
ceeds Congress’s authority under the Fifteenth Amendment, the 
Court added the question of whether it violates the Fourteenth as 
well.140  This shift serves to underscore the fact that, while the VRA 
was enacted first and foremost under the Fifteenth Amendment, the 
legislative history and case law involve a far more complex set of in-
teractions between the two amendments. 
When originally enacted, the VRA explicitly identified itself as a 
measure to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.141  One portion in par-
ticular, Section 4(e), however, was enacted to secure rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.142  Indeed, by the time of the 2006 reauthor-
ization, the purpose of the law was simply to preserve the right to vote 
“as guaranteed by the Constitution.”143  This language, clearly, evinces 
a congressional intent to legislate under the authority granted by 
both amendments and perhaps other provisions as well. 
As discussed earlier, the framers of the Fifteenth Amendment al-
most certainly did not understand the Fourteenth Amendment to 
 
140 See Tony Mauro, The Court’s Slight Rewrite in Voting Rights Case, NAT’L LAW JOURNAL (Nov. 
13, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202578216205 (“[T]he court [sic] 
did a slight rewrite of the question offered by Shelby County, adding the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the case—and giving a glimmer of hope to worried supporters of the Vot-
ing Rights Act.”). 
141 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (referencing the Fifteenth 
Amendment specifically when discussing enforcement). 
142 See id. at 439 (prohibiting discrimination against voters educated in Puerto Rico from be-
ing discriminated on the basis of the ability to speak English). 
143 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthoriza-
tion and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–246, 120 Stat. 577. 
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guarantee black suffrage.144  At the time of its adoption, the Fifteenth 
Amendment was really understood only to prohibit a voting provision 
that is racially discriminatory on its face.  Today, however, the notion 
that such a law could pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment is absurd.  The reality is that the Four-
teenth Amendment, as we understand it today, probably encompasses 
everything prohibited by the core guarantees of the Fifteenth 
Amendment.  In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Supreme Court upheld 
Section 4(e) of the VRA and confirmed congressional power under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit laws requiring a voter to read 
and speak English.145  Even in a pre-VRA case with no racial discrimi-
nation at issue, the Court held that “the Equal Protection Clause 
guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all vot-
ers . . . .”146  And of course, the Court has repeatedly held that racial 
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.147  It seems, therefore, as if 
the protections of the Fifteenth Amendment simply represent the 
very core of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protec-
tion of the laws.  In this light, is it unfair to ask what remains of the 
purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment?  Would it be wrong to de facto 
collapse the two amendments into one and, with them, their respec-
tive standards of review?  This Article answers the latter question in 
the negative for reasons detailed below. 
B.  The Limited Scope of the Fifteenth Amendment 
The first reason why the Boerne standard should not be applied to 
Fifteenth Amendment legislation such as the VRA is, simply put, that 
the Amendment’s narrow scope obviates the need for the Supreme 
Court to restrict Congress’s power to enforce it.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s core guarantees of equal protection and due process, 
and the power to enforce those guarantees, provide indispensable 
federal protection for civil rights.  To prevent an abuse of this broad 
grant of power, the Supreme Court, as part of its movement towards a 
“new federalism”148 has adopted a standard—congruence and propor-
tionality—under which Congress’s ability to enforce the Fourteenth 
 
144 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
145 Katzenbach v. Moragan, 384 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1966). 
146 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964). 
147 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (stating that all racial 
classifications must be narrowly tailored to achieve compelling state interests). 
148 See supra notes 114–19 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment’s guarantees is carefully calibrated to the interpretation 
of its meaning as articulated by the Court.149 
The Fifteenth Amendment, by contrast, is concerned primarily 
with the much narrower field of racial discrimination in voting.  As 
such, it is far less crucial that the Court so jealously guard it against 
congressional interpretation or redefinition.  As Professors Michael 
Dorf and Barry Friedman put it, 
unlike the Fourteenth Amendment [§] 5 power, the power to enforce 
the Fifteenth Amendment does not pose a risk of becoming a plenary 
power.  The Fifteenth Amendment is limited to a much narrower subject 
matter—race discrimination in voting—than the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  Hence, it could be argued, the Court can afford to grant Congress 
greater deference under the Fifteenth Amendment than under the Four-
teenth.150 
Preventing congressional overreach, arguably the central concern of 
the Boerne Court, is thus far less salient in the context of the Fifteenth 
Amendment and the VRA.  As a result, the Court may safely allow 
Congress significantly more latitude and need not apply so strict a 
standard of review to legislation enacted under § 2. 
C.  The Distinctiveness of the Fifteenth Amendment 
As argued above, modern conceptions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, specifically equal protection and due process, may well 
encompass the core guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment.151  One 
of the most important aspects of the Fifteenth Amendment is its sep-
arateness, the fact that it recognizes the special importance of the 
right to vote and the peculiar evils of racial discrimination.  For this 
reason, legislation meant to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment is en-
titled to a special deference in the form of a distinct standard of re-
view. 
By way of analogy, it is again worth considering the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  Supposing that the Fourteenth 
Amendment existed while the Thirteenth Amendment did not, it is 
still inconceivable that slavery could exist under our current under-
standing of the Equal Protection Clause.  Nevertheless, Congress was 
able to accomplish under the Thirteenth Amendment (prohibiting 
both public and private racial discrimination in housing) what it 
 
149 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520, 524 (1997). 
150 Dorf & Friedman, supra note 120, at 91 n.126; see also Caminker, supra note 121, at 1190–
91 (comparing the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments). 
151 See supra Part IV.A. 
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could not under the Fourteenth Amendment given the latter’s state-
action requirement.152  Just as important as the absence of an explicit 
state action requirement in the Thirteenth Amendment, however, is 
the Court’s assertion in the Civil Rights Cases that Congress has “pow-
er to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and 
incidents of slavery” in enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment.153  Re-
placing this standard with one borrowed from the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Jones Court may not have so easily upheld Con-
gress’s prohibition on private discrimination in housing.  The distinc-
tiveness of the Thirteenth Amendment made this possible.  Assuming 
one thinks that such a prohibition is a good thing, the difference be-
comes quite important. 
Like the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment’s dis-
tinctiveness is worth preserving, not only symbolically, but also prag-
matically.  It represents the recognition, in the Constitution’s text it-
self, of the importance of preventing racial discrimination in voting.  
That “the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired 
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights” is a 
long-recognized principle in American law.154  This principle and its 
enforcement are even more indispensable when the right of minori-
ties to vote is at issue.155  Thus, because of its narrow scope, the need 
to limit its enforcement through a higher standard of review is not 
pressing, and its danger of morphing into a plenary power is nonex-
istent.  And because of the particular importance of its protections, 
§ 2 should be preserved as a distinct source of congressional power 
subject to its own standard of review. 
CONCLUSION 
Last term, the Supreme Court seemed poised to consider the con-
stitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and with it, to de-
termine what standard of review should apply to the legislation en-
acted to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.  Somewhat surprisingly, 
however, the Court struck down the coverage formula on the 
 
152 See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968) (rejecting the argument 
that Congress lacks the power under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to ban private 
discrimination in housing). 
153 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
154 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
155 See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared:  Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the Voting 
Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 17 (2007) (arguing that “congressional power is at its apo-
gee when Congress acts to protect fundamental rights, [and] to protect suspect or quasi-
suspect classes”). 
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grounds that it violated the equal sovereignty of the states, and left 
unresolved the question of what standard of review applies to a stat-
ute enacted pursuant to Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 
The Reconstruction Amendments share a good deal of common 
history and language, and of course, a common purpose.  Neverthe-
less, there exist important differences in the amendments that have 
persisted from the time of their adoption to the present day.  These 
differences, naturally, carry over into the scope the amendments’ re-
spective enforcement clauses. 
Though the Court has never explicitly applied the Boerne standard 
in the Fifteenth Amendment context, it is possible, even likely, that 
the Court will do so in the future.  This would be a mistake.  First, de-
spite the similar language in the enforcement clauses, it is clear that it 
is not inevitable that the standards of review must be the same.  Se-
cond, an examination of the Court’s historical treatment of both § 5 
legislation and of the VRA reveals that the Court has thus far applied 
quite different standards to legislation enacted pursuant to these two 
amendments.  Finally, the special protections provided by the Fif-
teenth Amendment, as well as the Amendment’s narrow scope, mean 
that Congress’s power to enforce its protections deserves a special 
deference that cannot be achieved by borrowing a standard of review 
from the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
